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Abstract
In recent years “hostile architecture” or designs (also called “disciplinary architecture” and “defensive architecture”) 
has become an ever more common feature of our cities. Examples of these designs are benches you cannot sleep 
on, spikes you cannot stand on, and metal plugs you cannot skate on. These designs have created an outrage among 
activists and the general population since they have largely been conceived as an attack on the worst-off and there is 
an increasing academic body of work mostly looking into their design features, the motivations behind them, but also 
whether and under what condition they should be used.
Although progress has been made on the issue of these forms of architecture/designs, no clear definitions currently 
exist for “hostile architecture,” (etc.) and their related concepts, which are especially concerned with their respective 
environments, such as a “hostile environment.” As a result, there has been no clear discussion of how these concepts 
relate to each other and also to morally permissible and impermissible actions, which many times lead the discussion 
astray. In this paper I try to amend this by defining the central concepts, as well as showing how they relate to each 
other and morally permissible and impermissible actions.
Keywords: hostile architecture, defensive architecture, disciplinary architecture, definitions
Résumé
Ces dernières années, les « architectures hostiles » ou conceptions (également appelées « architecture disciplinaire » 
et « architecture défensive ») sont devenues de plus en plus courantes dans nos villes. Des bancs sur lesquels vous ne 
pouvez pas dormir, des pointes sur lesquelles vous ne pouvez pas vous tenir debout et des chevilles métalliques sur 
lesquelles vous ne pouvez pas « skater » sont des exemples de ces conceptions. Ces conceptions ont créé un scandale 
parmi les activistes et la population en général, car elles ont été en grande partie conçues comme une attaque contre 
les plus démunis. De plus en plus de travaux universitaires examinent principalement leurs caractéristiques concep-
tuelles, leurs motivations, mais aussi si et dans quelles conditions ils devraient être utilisés.
Bien que des progrès aient été accomplis sur la question de ces formes d’architecture / de conception, il n’existe 
actuellement aucune définition claire de « architecture hostile » (etc.) et des concepts associés, qui concernent 
particulièrement leurs environnements respectifs, tels que « architecture hostile ». En conséquence, il n’y a pas eu de 
discussion claire sur la manière dont ces concepts s’apparentaient les uns aux autres, ni aussi à des actions morale-
ment admissibles et inadmissibles, qui souvent égarent la discussion. Dans cet article, j’essaie de modifier cela en 
définissant les concepts centraux et en montrant comment ils se rapportent les uns aux autres et aux actions mo-
ralement admissibles et non autorisées.
Mots-clés: architecture hostile, architecture défensive, architecture disciplinaire, définitions
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Figure 1
Introduction
Recently, discussions have multiplied and outrage has intensified regarding what is often labeled hostile architecture, 
that is, designs in public spaces designed to make certain actions impossible, or almost so, in the spaces they occupy, 
for example, benches one cannot sleep on, spikes one cannot stand on, and metal plugs one cannot skate on. This 
phenomenon has been discussed in important international media venues, such as The Guardian, BBC, and CNN, 
among empirical scientists. Judgments have been overwhelmingly negative (Lockton 2011; Petty 2016; Smith and 
Walters 2018), as well as by philosophers who have either argued against such architecture (Rosenberger 2017).
Although progress has been made on the issue of these forms of architecture/design, no agreed-upon definitions 
currently exist for hostile architecture, also called disciplinary architecture or defensive architecture, and related concepts 
that are especially concerned with the respective environment, such as a “hostile environment.” As a result, there has 
been no clear discussion of how these concepts relate to each other and also to the question of morally permissible 
and impermissible actions, which, in many instances, leads the discussion astray. For example, it is often assumed that 
hostile architecture contributes to a hostile environment, making its use morally wrong (Petty 2016; Rosenberger 
2017, 2019), an argument that is far from clear when you tease these notions apart.
This paper, therefore, will help clarify the discussion about “hostile architecture” (etc.) by defining the central 
concepts, as well as by showing how they relate to each other and the question of morally permissible and imper-
missible actions. To do this, I will use the only framework I have seen for analyzing and constructing concepts in 
the field of social sustainability (de Fine Licht and Folland 2019) where in which “hostile architecture”  etc. operate. 
Ensuring a clear and concise conceptual scheme will further discussions of the conceptualization and evaluation of 
“hostile architecture” and the related concepts. Additionally, it will contribute to our ability to produce and analyze 
definitions in the area of social sustainability in general, which will give us a better idea regarding how to design our 
cities. However, I will not discuss every possible hostile (etc.) design out there since that would be a too vast endeavor 
and is being done excellently elsewhere. 
I will begin with the criteria of adequacy for definitions of these concepts; however, I will neither defend nor 
describe them at length (Brülde 2000, 2007; de Fine Licht and Folland 2019). Next, I will define “hostile,” “defensive,” 
and “disciplinary architecture” and “environment.” Finally, I will relate this conceptual scheme to morally permissible 
and impermissible actions, and end with the outlook and offering some concluding remarks.
Conditions of adequacy
We always produce or analyze definitions with certain purposes and aims in mind, which, in turn, may yield different 
conditions of adequacy pertaining to the definitions in question (Brülde 2000, 2007; de Fine Licht and Folland 
2019). In the case of defining “hostile architecture” and related terms, our aims are both practical and theoretical 
(Figure 1). They have to do with, in broad terms, the twofold desire to understand the existence and effects of such 
architecture and to be able to handle questions about it 
more wisely.  
When creating definitions entails both practical and 
theoretical aims, including that they should be able to be 
used by policy makers and scientists, Folland and I have 
argued elsewhere, that the definitions need to be coherent 
(not yield conflicting results), precise (measurable in prin-
ciple), reliable (measurable in practice), and comparable 
(enable comparisons at different levels) (de Fine Licht 
and Folland 2019). 
There are also benefits to producing a simple defini-
tion that makes it easier to measure outcomes. Thus, our 
definition of “hostile architecture” (and related terms) will 
be created while taking into consideration the conditions 
of coherence, precision, reliability, measurability, and simpli-
city (de Fine Licht and Folland 2019).
Additionally, the definition should capture what 
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most of us (after consideration) ordinarily mean by “hostile architecture”, including its positive and negative points. 
This is to avoid the definition excluding important aspects of the concept and people misinterpreting the term. 
Therefore, we also need to fulfill the conditions of ordinary language and value. To fully satisfy the former, a definition 
should accommodate or enable us to explain (1) judgments about what count as prime cases of hostile architecture, 
(2) disagreement and uncertainty about specific instances of hostile architecture, and (3) comparative judgments 
about what should be considered more or less “hostile” (de Fine Licht and Folland 2019).
Finally, the definition should also fulfill the conditions of amorality and normative adequacy (de Fine Licht and 
Folland 2019). The core of the amorality condition is that we not have an all-considered reason against utilizing, e.g., 
hostile architecture. Instead, there might be good reasons for implementing it although it seems that this is rarely so 
(see Section: “How decision-makers should handle different types of designs and environments”). 
Given our purposes, we also need to have concepts with a practical use, which, in turn, entails the context for their 
use. Therefore, different concepts will be devised, in part, with an eye to their usability and considering the role they 
could reasonably play to fulfill the condition of normative adequacy. Thus, we have the following eight desiderata 
listed in the table below. 
Definitions
Here, an attempt is made to define three terms that are used in the ongoing debates in this field: “hostile architec-
ture”, “defensive architecture”, and “disciplinary architecture” (de Fine Licht 2017). These will be discussed separately 
and together with the notions of their related environments (hostile environment, etc.). 
To set the stage properly, we will focus on “hostile architecture” and “hostile environment” since they are the 
most prevalent in the debate and a good starting point for other reasons related to the pedagogical structure of the 
paper. 
There are, of course, other terms used in the debate, among which “unpleasant” or “exclusionary architecture/
design” are the most important and common ones (Savičić and Savić 2013; Chellew 2019). The definitions of these 
terms will be discussed below, and it will be shown how they tie into the definitional framework of this paper.
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3.1 “Hostile architecture” and “environment”
In psychological research and in legal studies “hostility” is generally understood as either an attitudinal- or a be-
havioral construct, or a combination of the two (Eckhardt et al 2003; Walters 2014). When we are hostile towards 
someone (or something) it could be understood as us harboring a deep-seated ill will towards that someone (or 
something) and thereby perceiving them as a proper object for reactive attitudes, such as resentment, contempt, anger, 
and outrage, (Strawson 1974). When acting in a hostile way we simply subject that someone (or something) to the 
reactive attitudes typical of harboring deep-seated ill will, which in turn can take number of forms in terms of actions 
from, for example, the lifting of an eyebrow, shouting, to physical violence.
Thus, being- and acting in a hostile way can have severe consequences. However, even so, being hostile toward 
someone can sometimes be judged as proper or even morally obligatory. For example, if my closest friend is betrayed 
and humiliated by her husband for no good reason, it might be proper for me to feel and display hostility toward 
him. This reaction could be based on my relationship with my friend and the fact that he is morally responsible for 
a wrongly committed act, thereby blameworthy for doing what he did, and hence deserve to be treated accordingly. 
Now, whatever the justification for acting in a hostile way might be, it should be noted that the purpose of acting 
in this way is actually to harm the object we are hostile against, or at least if the object is harmed when we are being 
hostile, this is not something we regret. After all, if we for instance were to be hostile toward someone and they did 
not even notice it, or was not at all affected by it, we would not be happy about that outcome, ceteris paribus, but think 
that we had failed in some way. 
Nevertheless, since hostility is actually meant to harm, or at least not acknowledged as a negative outcome at 
the time the hostility occurs, through, for example, making them worse-off in terms of wellbeing or treating them 
with disrespect, which we generally have an obligation not to do, we need to have good reasons in order to treat the 
object of our hostility in this way. This is why, for instance, when Donald Trump went after Senator McCain in his 
presidential campaign on very spurious grounds, showing ill will and sending reactive attitudes his way, this was 
frowned upon by almost everyone, with the exception of  Trump’s staunchest supporters. 
Agential hostility can also be explicit (something the agent is aware of ) or implicit (something the agent is not 
aware of ). When someone, for instance, is screaming on the top of their lungs “I’m not angry”, there are cases when 
the person screaming is actually angry, even though they at the time does not recognize this by themselves. Similarly, 
we might be hostile and display reactive attitudes even though we do not understand that by ourselves. 
Correspondingly, we can portray “open” and “concealed” hostility. In a meeting, for instance, I can openly show 
my deep-seated ill will towards someone by giving several rude remarks, or I can be more subtle, being hostile in a 
more concealed way by, for example, ignoring what that person says while boosting others without being obvious 
about it. Thus, we will always need to do some interpretive work in order to understand if someone is hostile or if 
something else is going on. 
Of course, the fact that hostility can be implicit and concealed makes it less straight-forward to judge whether 
someone or something is hostile or not. Yet, since these possibilities lies at the concept core, and it would be hard to 
see that we would get what we want out of the definition if we took those way because of measurability or reliability 
reasons, they will be implemented in the definition even though this makes the results of applying the definition a 
bit more controversial. 
Likewise, our hostile attitudes and acts always has an object even though these objects can range from, for 
instance, the whole universe, individual groups-, people- behavior, non-human animals, or a single physical object. 
I can, for example, be hostile towards littering, the group who litters, individuals who litters, or all three. Of course, 
making littering my enemy might make individual litterers my enemies too. But I might also perceive them as a 
bit negligent and inculpably ignorant about the importance of not to litter. Since it might be different upshots and 
problems depending on where the hostility is focused, it is always important to examine what the object of hostility is. 
We are also often talking about objects and environments as being hostile without any agential involvement. 
Take for example deep space. It is not strange to say that this deep, empty, cold void is hostile towards us. Of course, 
just because we say things like that, we do not necessarily subscribe to an idea about divine creation with a creator 
with malicious intent. What we could mean instead is rather that deep space is a place not conducive to human life 
and flourishing because it treats us in a relevantly similar way to when agents are hostile towards our presence. It feels 
like space hates us and wants to kill us through strangulation, subjecting us to extreme cold or heat, just to mention 
a few examples, which could be construed as hostile acts on the higher end of the spectrum.
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Now, even though it is an interesting question whether physical objects and nature itself can harbor attitudes 
and act in certain ways, I am not saying anything about the metaphysics here. What we should agree upon instead, 
it seems to me, to get a useful definition which captures a morally important aspects of design, how we talk about it, 
and what we value, it is enough to concede that an object (or an environment) can display hostility if it is interpreted 
in that way by the user, in combination with, for example, a reasonable interpretation of the attitudes of the makers 
and society as a whole, or that the objects or environments have the effects relevantly similar to the effects of hostile 
treatment. So, if for example a group judges an environment to be hostile, and there is a plausible story about how 
this emanates from the deep-seated ill will among the decision-makers towards this group, then this environment 
should be defined as hostile if there are no reasonable arguments against this view.
Accordingly, an object or an environment can be defined as hostile if they are produced with explicit or implicit 
hostile intent or if  the object, or the environment, treats us in a hostile way. Of course, this implies that you could, 
for example, produce a hostile environment with no hostile intent, a friendly environment with hostile intent, and so 
on. Even though this might seem strange, that, for example, an environment can be hostile even though you had no 
hostile intent when creating it, it seems reasonable given how we generally think about similar matters in other areas. 
For example, a work of art “lives its own life”, it can be interpreted in different ways and used in different ways, after 
it has left the artist, and something similar seems to be true is true here. 
Last, acting in a hostile towards someone or something does not necessarily imply that the hostile party believes 
that her reactive attitudes will, for example, make the person go away, or stop doing what she is doing. Instead, we 
might display hostility because we want to treat people in the way they deserve, which might be to, for example, 
treat them with contempt, humiliating- or ignoring them. So, even though it is undeniably true that hostility is often 
expressed because, for example, the agent expressing it wants to modify people’s behavior or motivational structures 
in certain ways (etc.) (Björnsson and Persson 2012), it is not true that this is necessarily the prime justification for 
being hostile in the first place.  
With these reflections in mind, the definition of hostile architecture/design/environment is the following:
Hostile architecture/design/environment: x should be judged as “hostile design/architecture/environment” 
when x by proxy of an agent or by x itself displays (explicit or implicit/openly or concealed) ill will 
through reactive attitudes, or relevantly similar correlates, toward y (e.g. agents/behaviors/non-human 
animals) and try to harm y, or not caring if y is harmed, by this display of ill will at the time the hostilities 
occur. 
A prime example of what is considered hostile architecture 
is the so-called “anti-homeless spikes” hindering people sleeping 
and standing on a particular spot (Figure 2) (Petty 2016). Using 
the definition of hostile design above it is easy to explain why we 
consider these to be particularly hostile. First, they only have one 
use: to make people not to sit or to sleep in that area. Since there 
are almost only homeless people who use these areas in that way, 
it is easy to understand who the target is. Second, when you take 
away something important from someone (for example one’s place 
to sleep), and do not even bother to embellish it, that is often a 
sign of contempt. Third, spikes are also used to fend off unwanted 
animals (Savić 2013), and when human beings are “treated as ani-
mals”, this is often a sign of disrespect. Last, among important 
parts of some of the communities where these spikes have been 
put up, those who have been targeted has been seen as a mere 
nuisance and not victims of structural injustice or bad luck by 
those who are in charge. Hence, there is a plausible link between 
the perceived hostility of the spikes and the attitudes among the 
decision-makers who have put them there.  
Thus, there are at least some good reasons to believe that 
the spikes show deeply seated ill towards the homeless and since 
Figure 2
Below the Millennium Bridge, London, England
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Figure 5
Kinnekulle Natural Reserve, Sweden
many people believe that this is grossly unfair, this can explain the 
uproar against them.
To clarify further, we can think about designs that, despite 
all displaying the same function (e.g., benches we cannot sleep on), 
would nevertheless lead us to only judge some of them as hostile. 
The unsleepable benches that are most often considered hostile 
are those placed in public areas, such as in hubs for public trans-
port or by sidewalks (Figure 3), on which one cannot sleep or even 
sit for a long time. In this case, whether these benches should be 
considered hostile, probably in part depends on the intention of 
the designer and the planner who has put it there (with a pre-
sumably conscious or unconscious hostile intent) in combination 
with the interpretations of those who have nowhere to sleep ex-
cept in public. 
Compare this with two other types of benches on which 
sleeping is impossible or nearly so. In many old natural reserves 
in Sweden, you can see a wide range of “unsleepable” benches (Fi-
gures 4 and 5). These can hardly be judged to be hostile; instead, 
people probably see them (both those who have homes and those 
who do not) as very friendly since the intention was not to rob 
people of a place to sleep but rather to provide a place to sit and 
rest (Figure 4), or to create face-to-face interaction and, thereby, 
a sense of community (Figure 5). In all these cases, the producer’s 
(and planner’s) intentions probably play an important role in our 
judgment of an individual design even though the functioning stays the same. 
However, it should be noted that objects can be hostile even though the producer did not intend them to be. For 
instance, someone who produces unsleepable benches may be inspired to do so by other benches on the market, to 
serve the purpose of cleanliness, or something similar. Still, if these benches are used to fend off the homeless, and 
these people interpret them as society’s way of showing contempt for those living on the street, and many people in 
society actually do feel contempt towards them, then we would probably judge the bench to be an instance of hostile 
design and this can be explained by the fulfillment of some of the criteria for hostility above. 
The definition of hostile architecture above can also easily explain why people disagree about whether something 
is hostile or not but also why this might be unclear. Take, for example, the chairs that are more and more commonly 
used instead of benches in playgrounds and other areas (see Figure 6). These objects can be interpreted as hostile 
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people, people who have mental issues, problems with drug 
addiction, and other underprivileged populations. 
On the other hand, the purpose of these objects can 
be interpreted as giving planners more options when trying 
to create an area where people can relax and socialize while 
not having to sit next to strangers, as well as be able to read 
a book or engage in some other individual activity in a 
public space. This also rings true when thinking about the 
Swedish cultural context where there is a strong sense of 
personal space and where you would never in other similar 
circumstance, sit beside someone you do not know if you do 
not have to. Thus, the intentions in these cases are unclear 
and the cultural contexts seems to be compatible with both 
hostile and non-hostile intent, and so we can come down 
on different sides of the argument, which relates back to 
the definition of “hostile architecture”. Thus, the definition 
of hostile design can explain why we might disagree about 
whether a single object is hostile or not.  
According to what has been said so far, the definition of hostile design has a lot going for it. One problem, 
however, with this definition is that it might be considered not to fulfill the conditions of precision, reliability, and 
measurability, while because it is both simple and coherent, these two conditions are certainly fulfilled. However, the 
problem is that it seems impossible to keep the core features of what we actually mean and value when talking about 
these architectural styles while, at the same time, fulfilling the precision, reliability, and measurability conditions. 
Since it would be meaningless to provide a definition of the term hostile architecture (etc.) without its core fea-
tures, we need to sacrifice a bit of precision and so forth in order to keep talking about people’s actual concerns. Mo-
reover, a wide range of the factors discussed when it comes to hostility are at least sometimes observable, comparable, 
etc. For example, if the design of a functional object expresses a certain degree of contempt for certain groups, then 
there will be some observable empirical evidence for thinking that it represents an instance of hostile architecture. 
(The same reasoning applies to the definitions presented the section “Defensive architecture” and “environment” and 
the section “Disciplinary architecture” and “envrionment”).
Thus far, we have only considered hostile design in and of itself. We also need to discuss a hostile environment, 
which can be created both through the presence or absence of objects in a certain location; moreover, an object in 
one place might make another location seem 
hostile. In the debate, the notions of hostile 
architecture and hostile environment are 
conflated and believed to go together, but this 
is not necessarily the case. 
Indeed, a hostile design can make an 
environment in a certain area hostile, but not 
necessarily so; indeed, it can even have the op-
posite effect. For example, it is common today 
to use chairs instead of benches to dissuade 
people from sleeping in certain areas, such as 
playgrounds (Figure 6). Here, they are easily 
interpreted as being a part of what makes the 
playground hostile toward people who want to 
sleep there, and it is easy to see them as hostile 
in themselves if we think about their cultural 
context, in which sleeping in public is frowned 
upon. 
However, assuming that these chairs are 
hostile, they can, of course, be used to contri-
Figure 6
Södra Älvstranden, Gothenburg, Sweden
Figure 7
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
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bute to a non-hostile environment. For instance, when 
combined with benches, architects and designers that I 
have talked to have said that they can perhaps make a place 
look more inviting and provide for a wider range of uses 
(see Figure 7) than if it only had “sleepable” benches. Thus, 
not distinguishing between the environment and particu-
lar instances of design might lead to the wrong judgment 
concerning the wrong thing. 
 There might also be laws, policies, and infrastructures 
that make seemingly innocent designs either benevolent or 
malevolent. Consequently, we need an even more contex-
tualized understanding to judge whether a place qualifies 
as a hostile environment in a way we do not when exa-
mining what should count as a hostile design object. Un-
doubtedly, this makes the concept less precise, but it seems 
clear enough, with the huge upside of retaining the word’s 
original meaning and values. 
Furthermore, the environment can be hostile even if 
devoid of any hostile objects or even objects in general. For 
example, a common way of trying to keep people from 
hanging around in shopping malls without purchasing 
anything is to remove the benches for sitting and relaxing. 
These missing functional objects have been instructively 
termed ghost amenities (Chewell 2019)(Figure 8). In this 
case, the area where the bench used to be is an instance of 
hostile design. Similarly, when talking about design in a 
more general sense, measures such as playing loud or unap-
pealing music in the vicinity of the targeted group, using certain types of lighting to make pimples and blemishes 
more evident, or turning on sprinklers where people used to sleep can be instances of hostile design.
Finally, designs in one location might create a hostile environment in another. For example, in the city of 
Gothenburg, there were complaints about people sitting and drinking alcohol in Olskroken Square. In response, 
a two-minute walk from the square but divided from it by two big roads, the city built a wind shelter called Las 
Palmas (Figure 9) to communicate to the people drinking alcohol that they should sit there instead. The message was 
successfully communicated, and the group, 
to a large extent, convened at Las Palmas in 
its place. Here, we could argue that the city 
made the square hostile by setting up the wind 
shelter outside the square; assuming that this 
was so, then it seems reasonable to think it 
produced hostile effects in a place other than 
its location. 
 That certain designs/architectures are 
problematic in some contexts while being 
completely benign or positive in others is so-
mething that is beneficial to understand and 
conceptualize. This especially since it seems 
to be of greater moral importance to create 
non-hostile environments (if that should be 
an aim) than to think about particular designs 
that might be hostile in themselves. The moral 
priority when it comes to avoiding creating 
hostile environments in public and semipublic 
Figure 9
“Las Palmas” outside Olskroken Square, Gothenburg, Sweden
Figure 8
Masthugget, Gothenburg, Sweden
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spaces is reflected in the literature, where much research has been undertaken to investigate how, for example, shop-
ping centers and public squares have been made difficult to inhabit for those who do not have any money to spend 
(Crawford 2011; Smith and Walters 2018; Lehr 2019).
Last, one implication of the definition of “hostile architecture” and “hostile environment” is that when we talk 
about such designs or environments, we need to discuss what and whom they are hostile toward. This is a major 
benefit of these definitions since we, the discussants, are forced to speak in more concrete terms, which will make 
elucidating the relevant moral aspects easier. For example, in many contexts, it would be much more controversial to 
design against a group than a behavior. Admittedly, there might be things, such as hostile environments or objects, 
that are hostile toward anything we can think of and, therefore, are hostile in general. However, this will be easier to 
bring forward by examining a wide range of instances where the environments or objects are hostile. 
“Defensive architecture” and “environment”
When we talk about providing “defensive measures” in ordinary language we often think about measures put in place 
in order to avoid undesirable outcomes while trying to avoid other negative side-effects (etc.) because of the measures 
taken to avoid these outcomes. These measures are often accompanied with a sense of regret, disappointment, and 
sadness, instead of being imbued with reactive attitudes such as contempt and resentment as when we are taking 
hostile measures.  
For instance, there are defensive strategies for handling climate change that involve building dams, walls, and 
huge pumping stations to avoid the flooding of cities by extreme weather and rising water levels. These strategies are 
something most of us would like to be without, and we try to compensate for what ill these brings, but as it stands, 
when we have decisive reasons in favor of pursuing these measures, we try to go through with it. Thus, in comparison 
with when preforming hostile measures, we would not go through with measures that could not avoid the outcomes, 
which is not true when it comes to hostile measures. 
Of course, people sometimes worry that these efforts to make our cities resilient to climate change might 
potentially decrease our incentive to act on the core issue. This is not to say that most people judge such measures as 
morally wrong per se. Rather, they think the focus of such building projects is wrong and should lie elsewhere. Either 
that or they have other reasons for objecting to such infrastructure projects, judging them to be improper because 
they are ugly, crowd out other, more important things, etc. 
There is, then, a morally ambiguous notion built into the concept of “defensive architecture”. According to the 
conditions of ordinary language and value, even when used properly, there remain reasons for us not to want to use it 
at all. However, when employed properly, it is not morally wrong to use such architecture; it might even be morally 
obligatory, although we might not want to use it in the first place. 
Furthermore, and this is why it is important to distinguish between hostile and defensive, according to many 
normative theories and widespread understanding as well, there is an important moral difference between being hostile 
and being defensive as these notions are described here. When we are using hostile measures, we subject agents to 
reactive attitudes without necessarily trying to achieve certain outcomes besides harming them, or we have a certain 
outcome in mind, but we do not care at all that we need to harm people in the process. When we use defensive 
measures instead, we avoid using any reactive attitudes, try to mitigate or compensate for negative effects, and are 
primarily interested in achieving certain outcomes.   
To understand this better, we can compare it with a case from health care. A doctor is, in most countries, and 
according to most normative theories, allowed to subscribe painkillers to someone in severe pain even if the doctor 
can foresee that this will lead to a premature death of the patient. Given that the doctor has no other options in order 
to relieve the pain of the patient, and does not seek to kill the patient or try to kill the patient to relieve her pain, but 
instead just sees this as an unfortunate side-effect of the treatment, then it is allowed and sometime even morally 
obligatory to do so (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). 
Now, there are countries and normative theories that allow euthanasia, i.e., that allow doctors to kill the patient 
intentionally, but in the countries where this is allowed, there are other and often far more stringent demands on 
when it is permissible to actively help someone to die versus letting someone die due to an unfortunate side-effect. 
By analogy, the same would probably be true in the context of this paper as there might be cases where hostile 
architecture is allowed, but these cases would also be required to meet other and much more stringent demands than 
would be necessary for defensive architecture in order to be morally acceptable. 
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There are reasons to believe that the distinction between hostile and defensive architecture will be of practical 
use as well; hence, both will fulfill the condition of normative adequacy. During my years working with social sus-
tainability in urban development, I encountered and worked with many practitioners who were acutely aware of the 
effects of the development processes they conducted and the results of these processes, and they tried to do the best 
they could under the given circumstances. Of course, the circumstances are not always optimal, for instance, trying 
to create safe spaces through different design measures at bus stops to make them safer for some of the worst-off in 
society who only have access to public transport as a means of travel. Although creating such spaces might be the only 
alternative for these practitioners, they nevertheless regret that they need to do it. 
However, I have also met practitioners who are completely uninterested in questions of social sustainability and 
are only interested in creating a nice place for (middle- and upper class) people to hang out. Prima facie at least, it 
seems that the former group produces defensive architecture, while the latter group produces hostile architecture. 
Since these two attitudes, in combination with actions, have different moral valences, this distinction between hostile 
and defensive architecture is useful to make when discussing a specific design or area. 
With this being said, the definition of “defensive design/architecture/environment” is as follows:
Defensive architecture/design/environment: x should be judged as defensive “architecture/design/environ-
ment” when x by proxy of an agent or by x itself tries to halt an outcome O through the means M while 
not displaying ill will toward any y and trying to mitigate or compensate for the negative effects on y 
because of M. 
There are plenty of defensive designs in our cities. Think, for example, about buildings designed to have “eyes on 
the street.” ( Jacobs 1961). They have windows located so that people can easily see what is occurring on the street, and 
people on the street can see them looking. This is thought to help reduce crime and make people feel safer. Of course, 
architects might resent having to think about these considerations when building cities; nevertheless, we would like 
to get rid of crime and other abuses, after all, and as it happens, we live in a world with crime, and as long as it exists, 
we must plan accordingly. 
In the case with eyes on the street as described here, there is no hostility involved, just an attempt to avoid 
certain outcomes. Something similar might perhaps be said about the anti-tampering devices installed on fire posts 
(Rosenberger 2017). It is something that is installed without (we might assume) any hostile intent. There is just a 
need to contain the flooding of water in different areas, and there are no other practically applicable ways of achieving 
it. Or, take the crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) framework (Cozens and Love 2015). 
Many of the measures provided in this framework, such as cars and entrances should be located where everyone can 
see them, could be perceived as defensive instead of hostile and can be assumed to be implemented with no hostility 
in mind. 
When discussing defensive environments instead, a great example of this is the initiative, “the carpet of the red 
rose,” by the city of Malmö in Sweden. The city found that about 80% of those who used public spaces were male and 
20% female. In order to change this somewhat, the city decided to redevelop a parking lot into a space that would 
mostly attract women and, to some extent dissuade men from going there. The process was user-oriented, so a lot of 
women who lived in the neighborhood were involved, and they decided on, for instance, using a lot of red and pink, 
a lot of lights, etc. 
These measures where both supposed to attract women while having the opposite effect on men. Of course, 
most women have no inherent hostility toward men, and most men do not interpret a pink area to be hostile to them, 
etc. These are, instead, measures we have to use if we want to create a more equal use of public space. Thus, there was 
a need for creating an environment where men as a group was less keen on to occupy, while there was no deep-seated 
involved against them involved. 
The problem here is that the ordinary language condition might not be fulfilled to the fullest extent. The term 
defensive could easily conjure up images of barbwire fences and the like, leading to the incorrect impression as these 
probably should be considered hostile, but this also suggests that we might not have as sharp a conceptual boundary 
as necessary between “hostile environment” and “defensive environment.” This does not seem to be true, however, 
since when it comes to the ordinary language condition, the important thing is to capture the core of the concept’s 
meaning, and the definition clearly does that. When people apply the conceptual scheme, they will see that the 
residual notions can be captured by the other definitions instead. 
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Furthermore, even though it will be hard to separate the two notions in some cases, in most cases, it will often 
not be that difficult, and when it comes to the hard cases, the discussions about whether the environment should be 
considered defensive or hostile will become productive for both sides of the argument. Assuming the framework is 
used to discern whether something should be considered hostile, and the discussion is performed constructively, this 
approach will be much more productive than having more precise concepts where the intended meaning and values 
of the words connected to them are compromised; hence, the condition of normative adequacy is fulfilled. 
Last, the existence of some difficult cases actually speaks in favor of the definitions here. It is probably true that 
the difficult cases will be those in which people disagree about empirical claims such as what the intent was, how 
the people affected tend to interpret the designs, etc., and not that there is a conceptual overlap or vagueness in the 
definitions themselves. It is true, however, that the reliability condition might not be fulfilled. The same argument 
regarding this problem, which was described at the end of the section “Hostile archtecture” and “environment”, 
applies here as well. 
There are two other terms often used in the debate that have connotations similar to hostile and defensive design, 
namely, “exclusionary” and “unpleasant design”. (We will discuss unpleasant design in the next section.) In ordinary 
language, when talking about exclusionary measures, measures used against groups in certain places often come to 
mind. For example, decision-makers in Belgrade might not want to have Roma in the center of the city; for this 
reason, they might curtail the means of the Roma’s livelihood in that place. 
The way in which exclusion works, it is, furthermore, compatible with both defensive and hostile intentions. It 
seems that intentionally trying to “get rid of ” a certain population is inherently hostile, while it seems that some CT-
PED measures might be exclusionary while being defensive. Thus, using the term exclusionary could be compatible 
with both of the definitions described so far, and we might therefore use them interchangeably. However, since there 
is an important moral difference between hostility and being defensive, there are reasons in favor of using these terms 
instead of using the single term exclusionary.
“Disciplinary architecture” and “environment”
Finally, “disciplinary architecture/design” and “disciplinary environment” must be discussed. According to ordinary 
language and value, discipline might denote something positive or negative, while at the same time, in many cases, 
being paternalistic. 
Our children might need to be disciplined to become responsible adults even though they, as individuals, do not 
recognize this by themselves. This does not necessarily imply physical violence, which many today find excessive or 
a violation of children’s rights. However, they might be told when they have done something wrong and suffer some 
related consequences. Nevertheless, the goal of providing discipline is not, at least not always, to give ourselves, our 
children, or our subordinates the treatment they deserve. Rather, it has to do with molding someone in a certain way 
for the future, which again differs from the other modes of design discussed in this paper. 
To illustrate how this form of discipline can be enacted in urban design and planning take ancient Rome as 
an example. The leading magistrates did not allow the building of permanent theaters in the city for a couple of 
centuries after demand rose because they wanted an environment where people grew up to be manly warriors, not 
soft (“Greek”) city slickers. 
Something similar can be said about churches or very pious Christian environments (see Figures 10 and 11). 
The estate of the late Dag Hammarskjöld, former United Nations president and a devout Christian, was a place to 
meditate and discipline oneself. It is not difficult to see in Figure 10 that the bench is so narrow and uninviting as to 
make the sitter aware of the surroundings and even while sitting, make the sitter’s body a little stronger and healthier, 
with a mind aware of its surroundings (i.e. God’s creation). 
This is also true for the 11th-century bench in Figure 11 outside the church in Skara. You could sit down and 
rest, but there is no room for idling. Modern “standing benches” at many train stations (see Figure 12), where we get 
some moderate exercise while waiting for the train, provide a similar example. Something similar could perhaps be 
said when blue lights are used to prevent heroin use: it is not that there is any hostility involved, it is just that those 
who have set them up want to make the targeted group less prone to taking these kinds of drugs. 
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With all this being said, we arrive at the following definition:
Disciplinary design/architecture/environment: x should be judged as disciplinary “architecture/design/
environment” when x by proxy of an agent or by x itself x tries to mold the motivational structure of y 
toward specific ends E.
In addition to that this this definition can explain 
why we judge designs or environment as disciplinary it can 
also show why we might have conflicting judgments when 
it comes to whether something is, for example, hostile or 
disciplinary in design. Sometimes, it is argued that the 
standing bench is an instance of hostile design (Savičić and 
Savić 2013), while it was argued here that it is disciplinary. 
Of course, the reason this conflict of judgment is possible 
is that we might, for instance, have different views on what 
the intentions behind it were and so on. But then again, if 
these empirical matters were settled in one way or another, 
we would know what sort of design we had in front of us. 
Now, we could judge these disciplinary intentions to 
be morally wrong, and sometimes there are good reasons 
for such claims because, for instance, the realization of these 
intentions is paternalistic. If people do not want to stand 
while they are “sitting,” they should not have to. However, 
since we need to admit that quite large groups of people may 
not share this view, it would be good to have a definition 
that is neutral (and hence fulfills the amorality condition) 
with regard to the moral question at hand so that we can 
talk these matters through (and thereby fulfill the condition 
of normative adequacy). 
Even though you might think all disciplinary architec-
ture in practice is also hostile architecture, important diffe- Figure 12




Varnhem, 11th century church, Skara, Sweden
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rences exist between the intentions of the two designs. For example, disciplinary architecture might not have only the 
worst-off as its target; instead, it might want to reach everyone, perhaps especially the most well-off. Furthermore, 
disciplinary architecture might not want to push anyone out of a specific area; it might just want them to use it 
in a certain way. Standing instead of sitting is just one example of this; the blue light used in, for example, public 
restrooms in order to dissuade substance abusers (Savičić and Savić 2013: 847–857) might be another. There are also 
sometimes overarching aims, such as turning people into better consumers (Smith and Walters 2018), which might 
be perceived as good, bad, or neutral, but not hostile.
As we come to the end of the discussion of the definitions, we should note that unpleasant design could be used 
in order to archive what people wish to achieve with all of the abovementioned designs (hostile, defensive, and dis-
ciplinary designs). Rothstein writes about this nicely in his chapter, “The Pleasant/Unpleasant Dynamic: Emotional 
Feedback as Systemic Topology” (Rothstein 2013). He argues that pleasant and unpleasant emotions are at the low 
end of the emotional spectrum but that these emotions can be used to control people in a range of different ways 
(Rothstein 2013: 281; see also Savičić and Savić 2013: 80–257). Unpleasant design, in which design is perceived as a 
product of an intentional act, is thereby an artifact or “silent agent” that can help to control people’s behavior through 
their emotional responses to these designs. 
Now, since pleasant and unpleasant do not imply anything about whether the intent is hostile, defensive, or 
disciplinary, they fit into our framework of different concepts nicely in that they represent a means of reaching the 
goals of the three aforementioned design types. For example, we might want it to be somewhat unpleasant to sleep at 
a bus stop because we want commuters to be comfortable when standing there waiting for the bus to arrive. However, 
this is accomplished through the significant efforts of those who design this bus stop, and as is common knowledge 
in the community, there are also other places to sleep; hence, the benches are to be interpreted as defensive through 
the means of being unpleasant (to sleep on). 
However, and as was argued above, since the different designs have different moral valence, it is probably better 
to stick to definitions presented in this paper such that these morally relevant differences are not lost when we in the 
next step try to evaluate different designs and environments. 
How decision-makers should handle different types of designs and environments 
We have three definitions that are similar but relevantly 
differently devised so that they can be used to inform 
a discussion among researchers, industry, and deci-
sion-makers. What will be outlined here is placement 
and actions regarding these different designs and en-
vironments. The discussion will look at the designers/
designs and a subgroup of those responsible for the 
environment, namely, urban planners; however, a similar 
line of reasoning can also be applied to many other de-
cision-makers. 
Planners and environments
With regard to environments, decision-makers have a 
prima facie reason to avoid producing hostile environ-
ments. The reason is that there are few groups that de-
serve to be treated in a hostile way, and since we might 
harm people by treating them thus, we should try to 
avoid it. However, this prima facie reason can be trumped 
by others. The first has to do with treating people as they 
deserve, and the second with more pragmatic reasons. 
As for treating people as they deserve (e.g., with respect), 
this might be applicable to the well-off disrespecting Figure 13
Gothenburg, Sweden
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less-fortunate groups or the ongoing behavior of such groups, despite their having presented reasonable claims to 
obtain consideration of their rights. 
For example, take the case of skate-stoppers (Figure 13). These prevent people from riding their skateboards 
in a certain spot. Sometimes, these are considered hostile and to produce a “hostile environment,” and this can be 
explained by their hostile signaling. This “hostile environment,” hostile toward skateboarding and skateboarders, that 
is, might, under certain circumstances, be deserved and, thus, at least morally permissible to create. Skateboarders 
are often well-off middle-class individuals, and their well-being is plausibly not negatively affected but positively 
so, at least if they can be persuaded to go to a skatepark instead, because they will be at less risk of injury when they 
ride their boards there (Forsman and Ericsson 2001; Lustenberger et al 2010). Assuming that the community that 
installed the skate-stoppers has tried to discuss the issues with the skateboarders (e.g., destruction of property and 
danger to pedestrians) and have received disrespectful replies, the community might be justified in making the en-
vironment hostile toward this group. But then again, having been a skateboarder myself, there are pragmatic reasons 
for favoring other measures since such a conflict might induce this group to remain instead of going somewhere else 
and, as a result, intensify the conflict. 
Another case in which it might be morally permissible or obligatory to create a hostile environment is when 
it comes to bus stops and similar places where those who are not well-off need to go in the conduct of their daily 
lives. This case is often rather different from the one above in the sense that here, we often have a conflict of interests 
among the least well-off. For example, take the fact that the Los Angeles public transport system largely consists of 
buses. Here, the least well-off are the most frequent users of public transport. Furthermore, bus stops are hotspots for 
crime (Loukaitou-Sideris 1999). Crime rates seem to fall when these places are designed so that people do not want 
to hang around them when not waiting for the bus. In this case, it seems at least not to be morally wrong to design 
bus stops to reduce the crime rate for the least well-off. This should be combined with having a discussion with the 
people hanging around the bus stops in an attempt to understand what can be done for them and what they think 
about these issues, assuming that their suffering will not increase because of these designs. 
A third case in which it might be permissible to create a hostile environment is when it comes to terrorists and 
their behavior. For example, a few years back, there was a terrorist attack in Sweden during which a truck was used 
to mow people down on a shopping street. This prompted planners to install large concrete blocks on such streets in 
order to make similar attacks more difficult (Figure 14). However, these are often not hostile in nature—quite the 
opposite. They have, for instance, become extra sitting (and even sleeping) spaces, which makes the area feel less hos-
tile (Figure 14). This is probably because it is difficult 
to send a signal to the proper recipients without ma-
king others nervous, which probably, in general, gives 
us good reason not to act upon the notion of giving 
prospective terrorists what they deserve. However, if 
there were some way in which we could utilize hos-
tile architecture in order to give terrorists what they 
deserve, assuming that they deserve to be treated with 
hostility, then this would be morally permissible. 
The point of these cases is to illustrate that if we 
examine or are planning an area, we should try to make 
it non-hostile. However, sometimes, it is morally per-
missible because of how people deserve to be treated 
or other pragmatic reasons to make it hostile instead. 
However, these cases should be thoroughly argued for 
since we have a presumption against producing hostile 
environments. As for disciplinary environments, there 
are prima facie reasons for not creating them if their 
goals are not in accordance with those of the public 
when the public has not been directly involved in de-
cision-making. This is because they would be paterna-
listic in nature (Mill 1892). Figure 14
Kungsgatan, Gothenburg, Sweden
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Figure 15
Uppsala railway station, Sweden
However, there are exceptions to the rule that 
we should not act in a paternalistic way, and there 
are many things the public might desire that require 
discipline. For example, one could argue that public 
health might be improved by banning escalators and 
removing parking lots so that people need to walk 
more. This might be justified, even if the public would 
not like these measures, since health is often per-
ceived as beneficial to most of the worthwhile things 
in life (Daniels 2007). Hence, such minor paternalis-
tic infractions might be morally permissible in this 
context. However, since we have a prima facie reason 
against producing “disciplinary environments,” we 
must provide good reasons for trying to create them. 
When it comes to creating a “defensive environ-
ment,” we have no prima facie reason to do one thing 
or another. There are always outcomes we would not 
like to incur, and, as long as they are morally permis-
sible or obligatory, they are something to pursue in the appropriate context. 
Designers and designs
When it comes to the designers and their designs, their reasoning will be somewhat different from that of the policy 
makers, which has to do with the fact that designers do not implement their designs, someone else does; hence, they 
need to consider the eventual use of their designs and make a consequent judgment. However, since few designs are 
morally prohibited per se, there is reason to think there are no prima facie reasons against any sort of design, however 
malignant it may seem. The caveat here is that if a design’s sole use were immoral, such as pushing certain people 
out of an area without good reason, then the designers would have a prima facie reason not to produce such a design. 
There is reason to believe that designing and producing the benches seen in Figure 3 (and ones of relevantly 
similar design) are today often conducted in an immoral way, and these artifacts do not contribute anything positive 
in terms of helping planners to become more flexible in how they design a certain place. If planners want to create 
an environment, for instance, where people do not want to hang around, then they can use chairs instead of benches, 
which they sometimes do (Figure 15). There have also been a vast number of complaints regarding the usability of 
these benches and similar designs from ordinary users and “extreme users,” such as people with disabilities. They are 
simply impossible, or nearly so, to use for the purpose they were designed for, which is for people to be able to sit 
down on them and catch their breath. Thus, designers and others should be hesitant to produce such benches and 
similar designs for moral and prudential reasons. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, three distinct definitions of different modes of design and corresponding environments (hostile, defen-
sive, and disciplinary) have been presented. Within this conceptual framework, we have seen that the discussion of 
designs is highly complex, they might not be connected in an intuitive way, and moral judgments about them might 
be equally surprising. For example, “hostile design” is, by its very definition, often considered morally wrong and lead 
to “hostile environments.” We have seen in this paper, however, that this is hardly so. Indeed, “hostile architecture” 
might lead to an “unhostile environment,” and, sometimes, we might have a moral obligation to produce “hostile 
environments.”
Of course, a lot of work remains. For one, this rather negative conceptual framework needs to be related to a 
more positive one using concepts such as “inclusive architecture,” “universal design,” etc. There is also a great need 
for more empirical studies to investigate, for example, why designers produce designs in the first place, how they are 
used in general, and their effects. It is also important to have a much more thorough debate about the moral issues 
concerning designs and environments, including when they are right, wrong, and the conditions that determine their 
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appropriateness. It is hoped that this paper will encourage others to ask these questions, thereby making the field a 
bit clearer such that the quest for knowledge becomes a bit easier. 
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